18 Feb A study on “Command and Control” and its application in tactical operations
A study on “Command and Control” and its application in tactical operations
Senarat Jayasekera © 2005 BAvM CRMI MHF
Any project requires pre-planning if an anticipated outcome is to be realized with the amount of pre-planning depending on the intensity of the project. Even with pre-planning, the overall guidance, direction and relative feedback have to be constantly monitored for success. In a military atmosphere, gone are the days when the commander sat astride his horse atop a hill or hillock and directed his troops by careful observation of the battlefield movements around and below him. Modern day battles encompass vast areas that make it virtually impossible for even a platoon commander to observe movements of his troops. Therefore the all-important implementation of direction and obtaining feedback, better known as ‘command and control’ take on new meaning at all levels of warfare. This essay examines the various characteristics and importance of “command and control” prior to examining the requirements for successful tactical operations. It finally provides a link-up of successful ‘command and control’ exercised in tactical operations.
“Command and control” helps commanders to make the most of what they possess. With an effective command and control system, the aim of reducing the time factor as much as possible is achieved preparing for the operational order and implementing the order (Mizrachi, 1996). Additionally, it permeates all military functions and operations by giving them meaning and harmonisation (USMC, 1996). If these statements are to be considered seriously, then every factor associated with aiming for a successful military operation boils down to nothing without proper command and control!
Figure 1 (Land Warfare Conference 2001)
Both the Strategic level and the Operational level of warfare precede the Tactical level of war if the all-important levels of warfare are considered. Similarly, the levels of the various commands also assign the third and last place to tactical command. Although the last in the three-tier level of command (Figure 1), it bears great importance as it is the tactical level that plans and conducts engagements to support operational level objectives not to mention the objectives of the strategic level (Warner, Finklaire & Pacey, 2001). Additionally it is at the tactical level, that forces are deployed directly for battle with the enemy thereby requiring the commanders at this level to exercise the art of ‘organising and manoeuvring’ – better defined as ‘tactics’.
The overlapping of the three levels of command (Figure 1) also depicts the importance each level has on the other two levels of command. Here too, the tactical level of command (and control) is crucial as the commander’s decisions at this level, affects all tiers of the command chain. Orders issued at the Grand strategic, Military strategic or operational levels of warfare can easily be distorted by the wrong application of ‘command and control’ at the tactical level of warfare. Conversely, skilful application of ‘command and control’ to achieve positive results at the tactical level of warfare can bring about advantages at all the higher levels. Napoleon’s exploits on the battlefield, at tactical levels, were to entice him to make bigger and grander plans that were once more fed into the grand strategic and strategic levels of planning thus creating a loop utilising the levels of war (Van
Creveld, 1985). Therefore the importance of ‘command and control’ especially in a tactical environment cannot be overstated.
A typically observed scenario at all levels of warfare, across the ages, is to see a commander issuing orders or ‘commanding’ his subordinates. The commander is “in control” of his subordinate whereas the subordinates are “under the control” of the commander [(USMC, 1996), Figure 2A]. A better model has evolved that is being utilized in modern times across all levels of warfare and especially at the tactical level.
‘Command and control’ is now considered ‘an initiation of action’ (the command) and ‘a feedback’ (the control) exercised by commanders and their subordinates respectively (Figure 2B). This initiation of action and corresponding feedback should be considered the crucial bedrock for ‘command and control’ to be exercised in tactical operations.
At the tactical level of operations, commanders have many options to achieve their aims. One criterion is however very certain. The commander, in this instance the tactician, has extremely imperfect knowledge of the intensions of the adversary. Therefore he must initiate his actions in anticipation of the adversary’s actions. Situational awareness in large doses therefore should be a key ingredient and thereby an important positive catalyst when exercising command and control during tactical operations.
The commander has two key methods of issuing command and obtaining feedback with the aim of being in control during crucial tactical operations. The first method refers to Auftragstaktik or “directive control” whereas the second method is referred to as Befehlstaktik or “controlled by detailed order” (Leonhard, 1991).
Directive control is exercised when the commander informs his aim relative to the enemy as well as the mission and aim of the friendly troops. Although the aim and intent are clearly informed, the commander will refrain from informing his subordinates how to carry out the mission. The subordinates in turn are allowed to utilise their own initiative and make their own decisions so long as they stay within the commander’s indicated parameters. Opportunities once noted could be pursued and exploited so long as they contribute to the overall situation.
Befehlstaktik or the ‘controlling by detailed order’ is the more traditional form of command where subordinates carry out explicit and detailed orders issued by the commander. Little room is made available for subordinate innovation as well as initiative in this form of command. Unified action is the result by this type of command and control during tactical operations.
The German WW II commander, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel encouraged innovation among his troops and was a general who commanded and controlled utilizing “directive control”. However on many occasions he also practised commanding and controlling by detailed order. On the opposing side, the Soviet commander Marshall Georgi Zhukov utilized ‘control by detailed order’ throughout
his trademark campaigns during his military career from Khalkin Gol to Berlin. Each method of command and control namely Befehlstaktik and Auftragstaktik have their own advantages and disadvantages during tactical operations. It will always depend on the commander to decide what best method is to be utilized to achieve his aim given the criteria at a particular time.
Once a suitable method of command is selected, a commander can utilise ways and means to let his train of thoughts be carried over to the battlefield. Exercising of command can thereafter be carried out;
- via designated authority
- through directives and plans and last but not least
- through skilful decision-making coupled with enhanced leadership characteristics.
Control on the other hand can be exercised;
- through the feedback of communications
- by setting up various control measures to suit the environment and
- through coordination of resources.
The perpetual feedback provided to the commander by way of progress of friendly troops, reaction of the enemy and the latest intelligence reports will enable him to issue further orders streamlining and fine-tuning his previous orders or to issue fresh directives depending on the current situation at hand. Command and control should therefore be constantly exercised in tandem during tactical operations.
The initiation of action and obtaining a feedback during tactical operations can be taken a step further by depending on an important ‘loop’ derived by Col. John Boyd of the US Air Force. Named the OODA loop, this continuous circle helps the commander to utilise command and control with greater efficiency during tactical operations (Figure 3).
The OODA-loop which consists of ‘Observation’, ‘Orientation’, ‘Decision’ and ‘Action’ fits in such a manner to absorb the actions of ‘command and control’ at any given time. With ‘observation’ encompassing the feedback from the subordinates, the commander can then ‘orient’ himself relative to the enemy and friendly forces. With situational awareness playing a part, the commander can then ‘decide’ on the best course of action to be taken and in what manner the action should be initiated. Having decided on the best course of action and the type of order that should be issued, the commander can then ‘act’ out his decision thus completing the loop prior to another OODA-loop being initiated.
The importance of command and control at tactical level cannot be overestimated. Command and control in the modern day is refined with the commander initiating action and subordinates constantly providing feedback that enables the commander to exercise control. Two methods of initiating action namely ‘directive control’ and ‘control by detailed order’ enable commanders to exercise authority in tactical operations depending on the required outcome and aim. The OODA loop as an important tool enables the commander to further enhance his situational awareness during ongoing tactical operations resulting in better command and control procedures.
References
Leonard, R. (1991). The Art of Manoeuvre: Manoeuvre-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (pp. 6, 113 – 118, 283 – 286, 52 – 55,). New York: Ballantine Publishing Group.
Mizrachi, A. (1996). In Margiotta, Col. F. D. (Ed.), Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare (pp. 226 – 241). Washington: Brassey’s Inc.
Van Creveld, M. (1985). Command in War (pp17 – 57). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
United States Marine Corps. (1996). Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (MCDP 6). Washington.
Warner, N., Finklaire, T. and Pacey, B. (2001). Land Warfare Conference 2001: Tactical Situation Awareness – A Multi-Layered Approach. Sidney: November 2001.
No Comments